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Do the short and medium term adjustment costs associated with trade liberalization influence schooling
and child labor decisions? We examine this question in the context of India's 1991 tariff reforms. Overall,
in the 1990s, rural India experienced a dramatic increase in schooling and decline in child labor. However,
communities that relied heavily on employment in protected industries before liberalization do not
experience as large an increase in schooling or decline in child labor. The data suggest that this failure
to follow the national trend of increasing schooling and diminishing work is associated with a failure
to follow the national trend in poverty reduction. Schooling costs appear to play a large role in this
relationship between poverty, schooling, and child labor. Extrapolating from our results, our estimates
imply that roughly half of India's rise in schooling and a third of the fall in child labor during the 1990s
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Trade liberalization is one of the most common policy prescriptions offered to initiate poverty 
eradication in today’s developing countries. Standard trade theory is clear on the many long-term 
benefits of trade liberalization working through lower prices on consumption goods and production 
inputs, greater competition, and opportunities for specialization. Most of the concern about trade 
liberalization focuses on the impact of the loss of protection on those currently employed in protected 
industries. Several empirical studies document the adjustment costs born by these workers subsequent to 
trade reforms in many developing countries (see, for example, Harrison and Hanson (1999) and 
Revenga (1997) for Mexico, Currie and Harrison (1997) for Morocco, Attanasio et al (2004) and 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2005) for Colombia, Topalova (2005) for India).  
Our study considers whether these short and medium-term adjustment costs of trade reform 
influence the schooling and work decisions of children. There are several possible channels through 
which the labor market impacts of trade liberalization could affect households’ investment in the human 
capital of their children. First, most of the above studies document a correlation between living 
standards and the loss of workers’ protection from trade liberalization (see Harrison (2006) for a 
review). While the empirical relationship between living standards and child labor or schooling is not as 
robust as theory often assumes (Basu 1999), living standards seem one obvious channel. Second, the 
child’s economic contribution to the household may be affected by the loss of protection or the 
structural shifts associated with it. A number of studies pioneered by Schultz (1960), Rosenzweig and 
Evenson (1977) and Rosenzweig (1982) have established a connection between the demand for child 
labor and schooling and children’s participation in the work force. Third, the structural change in the 
economy as a result of trade liberalization may affect returns to education, which in turn will influence 
educational attainment (Becker 1965, Foster and Rosenzweig 1996). The more diffuse benefits of trade-
induced changes in consumer prices, market structure, productivity, incentives for innovation, etc. are 
unlikely to be captured through a focus on employment loss of protection.
1 However, understanding the 
implications for children of the adjustment costs associated with trade reform’s impact on the labor 
                                                 
1 Several studies assess the aggregate relationship between trade and child labor or schooling (Shelburne 2001, Cigno, 
Rosati, and Guarcello 2002, Edmonds and Pavcnik 2006), while Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) examine variation in 
child labor with changes in relative prices during an export expansion. The present study is distinct in its focus on an 
actual trade policy change, its focus on adjustment costs, and the degree to which it identifies the channels that underlie 
the trade reform – schooling – child labor relationship. 
  1market is important given the theoretical possibility of poverty traps generated by a lack of education 
(Barham et al 1995), child labor (Basu and Van 1998), or occupational choice (Banerjee and Newman 
1993). Moreover, a better understanding of the channels influencing schooling in the context of trade 
adjustment may shed light on how human capital accumulates as countries grow and what policies 
might best expedite this process. 
We examine these issues in the context of India’s 1991 trade reform. In August 1991, in 
response to a severe balance of payment crisis, India agreed to an IMF adjustment program that 
stipulated a substantial liberalization of trade policy. Import tariffs across all sectors were drastically 
reduced and brought to a more uniform level. Set largely by the 1991 agreement, tariff changes over the 
1992-1997 were not the result of the usual political economy process and were unlikely to have been 
anticipated by labor as tariffs had not changed substantively since the mid 1950s. We exploit 
heterogeneity in the pre-reform industrial composition of employment across Indian districts and 
differences across industries in the magnitude of tariff declines over time to study the impact of tariff 
reductions on child time allocation.  Each of India's states and territories is subdivided into districts for 
administrative purposes. Microeconomic studies of rural India from Rosenzweig and Evenson (1977) to 
Duflo and Pande (2007) focus on the district as the relevant labor market unit because of very low rates 
of permanent mobility between districts. By focusing on differences across districts in changes in tariff 
protection, we cannot evaluate the impact of tariffs on economy wide schooling and child labor. Rather, 
we consider how schooling and child labor changes differ in districts with large changes in tariff 
protection on employment relative to districts with little change in tariff protection.  
We observe smaller increases in school attendance among children in rural districts where 
employment was concentrated in industries exposed to large changes in output tariffs. Literacy also 
appears diminished relative to the national trend. The findings are robust to a variety of approaches to 
deal with the potential endogeneity of the baseline composition of employment and the confounding 
effects of concurrent reforms in other parts of the economy.  We find no relationship between reform-
induced tariff declines and changes in school attendance for children in pre-reform data. In addition, 
there is no relationship between tariff declines and changes in literacy in older cohorts whose education 
should have been completed before the onset of trade liberalization. These robustness checks provide an 
important validation of our empirical approach. 
  2A strong poverty-schooling relationship is the most likely explanation for our findings.  As 
documented in Topalova (2005), higher exposure to trade liberalization is associated with slower 
poverty reduction relative to the national trend in rural India. Narrative evidence from rural India in the 
Public Report On Basic Education in India (1999) emphasizes schooling costs as a major reason 
children either never attend or drop out of school, and our data are most consistent with the avoidance of 
schooling related costs as the explanation for the poverty-schooling relationship in this study. While 
children work more in districts with larger tariff declines, the additional work is largely in activities that 
will not bring direct wage income (i.e. domestic work) and the changes in schooling are much larger 
than the (relative) increase in work. In fact, there is a significant rise in children who report neither 
attending school nor working. We also observe reduced schooling expenditures and increased reports of 
families taking loans for education. Moreover, we find some suggestive evidence that the impact on 
school attendance of declines in tariff protection on employment is more pronounced in areas with 
higher schooling costs.  We observe little evidence of a strong link between employment exposure to 
tariff changes and returns to education or child labor demand. 
This emphasis on schooling costs to explain a poverty-schooling connection is important in 
understanding human capital investment. The empirical evidence on the poverty-child labor-schooling 
link is fraught with econometric challenges. Even studies that find a robust statistical link do not 
pinpoint the reason for this relationship (Behrman and Knowles 2001, Glewwe and Jacoby 2004, 
Edmonds 2005, Yang 2006). Theory often attributes a connection to parental preferences (Basu and Van 
1998) and the marginal utility associated with the child’s direct economic contribution (for example, 
Baland and Robinson 2000). However, our emphasis on schooling costs is consistent with Thomas et 
al’s (2004) observation that the largest changes in schooling in Indonesia during its financial crisis were 
among younger children with the least chance of making a direct economic contribution. Moreover, 
recent experimental evidence from Angrist et al (2002) and Duflo et al (2006) shows substantive 
changes in schooling resulting from interventions designed to lower schooling costs. These experiments 
cannot examine the relative importance of schooling costs in explaining the link between changes in 
living standards and schooling, and our results suggest that schooling cost play an important role. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide a conceptual framework. In Section 3, 
we describe the data and Indian trade reform. In Section 4, we outline the empirical methodology. 
  3Section 5 discusses the empirical estimates of the relationship between schooling and tariffs and 
establishes the robustness of results. Section 6 explores the underlying mechanisms behind the 
relationship between schooling and tariff changes. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Conceptual Framework 
The benefits of trade liberalization are diffuse while the costs tend to be concentrated in well defined 
groups that benefit from protection. Thus, the political attention directed towards trade liberalizations 
often emphasizes the adjustment costs born by formerly protected workers, and there is a corresponding 
empirical economics literature devoted to understanding these adjustment costs (see Harrison (2006)).  
How might schooling be influenced by the trade adjustment process? Changes in living 
standards, child labor demand, and returns to education stand out as likely mechanisms. Consider a 
household with one adult, one child, and a single family decision-maker. Denote  0 y as the household's 
income when the child is not in school, and  S y as the household's net income when the child is enrolled 
in school.  S y is net of direct and indirect schooling costs c and the loss of the child's economic 
contribution caused by schooling w*,  0 * S y ywc = −− . While there is no consensus on the value of the 
net economic contribution of children in the child labor literature, schooling costs can be considerable. 
In India, primary school tuition is theoretically free, but other direct costs including fees, books, 
uniforms, tutoring, and transportation costs can and indirect costs associated with the child’s need to 
conform to the social norms of students in the school be substantial. 
The family sends the child to school if the utility from schooling the child is higher:  
(1)    () () 00 ,, ss uys e uy e +≥ + 0
where  ,  k e { } ks , 0 ∈ , is an additively separable, mean zero, i.i.d stochastic term. We assume that the 
family views the return to schooling as a contribution to the child's future welfare and treats it as 
additively separable from today's consumption.
2 For simplicity, we define r as the linear return to 
schooling and α  as the weight the family puts on the child's return to education. The utility from 
                                                 
2 We implicitly assume credit constraints that prevent families from borrowing against future returns on education. 
While we are not aware of direct evidence of an effect of credit constraints on schooling in India, Banerjee and Duflo 
(2004) document severe credit constraints for manufacturing firms in India in the late 1990s. 
  4schooling the child is then:  () ( ) 0 ,* , s uys vy w cp r α =− − +  where v(-) is the indirect utility associated 
with income  S y at the vector of consumer prices p.  
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Define  0 s uee =− which is mean zero with cdf F(u) and strictly positive density f(u). (2) can be written 
as:   () ( ) ( 0 Pr( 1) * , , s Fvy w cp r vy p α == − − + − ) 0 .  To analyze the determinants of changes in 
schooling attendance, we totally differentiate: 
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where  and  () 0 *, s vv ywc p =− − ( ) 00 , vv y p = . In the present discussion, we treat schooling costs as 
fixed (dc=0). Since our empirical strategy will focus on exposure to trade liberalization through 
differences in sectoral composition of local employment, we abstract from the tariff’s effect on the 
marginal utility of income through the consumption channel.
3 Thus, tariff declines (dt) influence 
schooling through changes in family income, y0, returns to education, r, and the child's potential 
economic contribution to the household, w*.  
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This implies three explanations for declining schooling in the context of declining final product 
protection for employment ( ). First, diminishing marginal utility of income implies  0 dt <
0 0 s vy vy ∂∂ > ∂∂ > . Thus, if tariff declines lower living standards, schooling declines. Second, 
increasing economic contribution of the child causes a fall in schooling (for a given income). Third, if 
parents put positive weight on returns to the child’s schooling, α >0, declines in the returns to schooling 
                                                 
3 As long as consumption bundles are not correlated with sectoral composition of employment across districts, the 
omission of the consumption exposure to trade liberalization will not bias our estimates of the impact of the 
employment exposure to trade reforms (see Section 5.5 for evidence). In addition, to the extent there is no significant 
variation in consumption bundles across areas in India, the impact through consumption is captured in the time trends. 
  5lead to declines in schooling. The relative importance of tariff declines for these channels and their 
ultimate importance in schooling decisions is an empirical question. 
3. Background 
3.1. Data 
Our analysis of the relationship between schooling, child labor, and exposure to tariff reform through 
employment composition relies primarily on the rural samples in the 43rd (July 87-Jun 88) and 55th 
(July 1999 - June 2000) rounds of India's National Sample Survey (NSS).
4 We analyze the activities of 
more than 95,000 children age 10-14.
 5 The NSS is a repeated cross-section at the level of individuals 
(households). Districts are matched across rounds, so that data has a geographic panel dimension.  
We consider several measures of the activities of children.
6 We define an indicator attend school 
that is one if a child reports attending school in the household roster regardless of his/her usual principal 
activity. We define a child's work status based on a survey question about the child's usual principal 
activity. The question distinguishes between the following categories of work: regular salaried/wage 
employee, casual wage laborer, begging, work in a household enterprise (farm or non-farm), and 
domestic work. A child is labeled working if his/her usual principal activity is in one of the above work 
categories. It is possible that a child's principal activity might be work while the child also attends 
school. We also define an indicator for whether a child works as a principal activity and does not attend 
school (i.e. work only) that we often refer to as “child labor.”  
We organize types of work into two categories. A child works in market work if his/her usual 
principal activity is working for wages (as regular salaried/wage employee or as casual wage laborer), in 
a household enterprise (farm or non-farm), or in begging.  Most children engaged in market work in 
rural areas are working on their family farm or business.  Domestic work includes attending domestic 
duties and free collection of goods (vegetables, roots, fire-wood, cattle feed ...), sewing, tailoring 
                                                 
4 NSS is a nationally representative, large-scale multipurpose household survey that provides information on household 
expenditures, household demographic characteristics, education, and employment.  
5The sample is restricted to children ages 10 – 14 since very few children below the age of 10 work and 14 is typically 
an upper bound on the definition of a child in child labor conventions such as the International Labor Organization's 
C182 on the worst forms of child labor. As a household survey, the NSS inevitably misses children who do not live 
within the sampling frame, such as sex workers, trafficked children, bonded laborers, street children, and the homeless. 
We are not able to infer anything about changes in the status of these children during India's trade liberalization. 
6 Changes in the NSS questionnaire over time have created substantive issues for the measurement of consumption, 
poverty, etc (see for example, Tarozzi 2005). However, our measures of the activities of children rely on questions that 
have been asked in a consistent manner in each of the survey rounds.  
  6weaving, etc. for household use. Policy tends to focus more on market work (and especially wage work), 
but a basic model of time allocation (e.g. Becker 1965) would suggest that movements in market work 
and domestic work should be related. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on schooling and child labor between 1983 and 1999/2000 
for rural India. In addition to the data from 1987 and 2000 that will be mostly used in this paper, we 
have included tabulations from the 38
th (Jan-Dec 1983) and 50
th (July 1993 - June 1994) rounds of the 
NSS in order to highlight the underlying time trends. Each mean in Table 1 is weighted to be 
representative for rural India in the given year. A clear understanding of the aggregate patterns 
summarized in Table 1 is critical for interpreting the findings in this study. School attendance has 
increased dramatically in rural India over the last twenty years. In 1983, less than half of children 10-14 
attended school. By 1999/2000, nearly three-quarters of children attend school.
7 This rise in school 
attendance is concurrent with a 65 percent decline in the fraction of children who are working without 
attending school. More than a third of rural children in 1983 worked without attending school while 14 
percent work without school in 1999/2000.
8 The bottom panel separates work into market and domestic 
work. The declines in market work and domestic work are similar in magnitude. Our identification relies 
on between district variations in exposure to national tariff changes.  Hence, we do not assess the 
importance of trade liberalization in these aggregate trends in school attendance or child labor.  
In addition to information about the activities of children, we also use the information on child 
demographics (gender, age) and household attributes (religion, caste or tribe, primary activity, 
household expenditure per capita, household size, information on household head (literacy, competed 
education, gender, age)) from the NSS in our analysis. In our robustness analysis we complement the 
NSS with data from additional sources that are described in detail in the data appendix.   
                                                 
7 There is no central compulsory schooling legislation. 15 states have compulsory schooling laws through age 14, 
mostly passed in the mid 1980s. We are not aware of any attempt to enforce these laws. The potentially most 
substantive changes in education policy over our 1987-1999 period of study are the abolition of tuition fees in 
Government primary schools, scholarship programs aimed at girls and scheduled castes and tribes, Operation 
Blackboard, and a national mid-day meals program. These programs may be important for the overall trends, but they 
do not appear to be correlated with tariff variation as we discuss below. 
8 In theory, child labor in factories, mines, and hazardous activities have been prohibited in India since 1986. In 
practice, serious enforcement of this legislation appears to be beginning in 2006. Most working children in the NSS are 
engaged inside their family enterprise and are outside the scope of this legislation as it is being implemented in 2006. 
  73.2 Indian Trade Reform 
India provides an excellent setting to study the relationship between trade policy, child labor and 
schooling. In the August 1991 currency crisis, India initiated unilateral trade liberalization as a condition 
of an IMF bailout. Several features of the trade reform are crucial to our study. First, because tariffs 
were high prior to 1991, the reform drastically reduced the level of tariffs. The average tariff declined 
from 83 % in 1991 to 30% in 1997 (Figure 1).
9  Tariff reductions are smaller in some sector than others, 
but all sectors of the economy are affected. Figure 2 depicts average tariffs for cereals and oilseeds, 
agriculture (other than cereals and oilseeds), and manufacturing and mining over time.  Second, the 
liberalization was instigated as part of the IMF program conditions in response to the 1991 currency 
crisis and came as a surprise (Hasan et al, forthcoming).
10 The reforms were unanticipated in the sense 
that they were unlikely foreseen in schooling and child labor decisions made by households during the 
1980s and in the district industrial composition before the crisis. In fact, Varshney (1999) reports that as 
late as 1996, less than 20 percent of the electorate had any knowledge of the trade reform.  
Third, the IMF conditions required a reduction in the level and dispersion of tariffs, 
drastically altering the structure of protection (Chopra et al, 1995). Industries with larger pre-reform 
tariffs experienced larger tariff declines. This is not a pattern that would be expected if traditional 
political economy concerns played an important role in India’s trade liberalization of 1991. Goyal 
(1996) argues that the reforms were passed quickly as a sort of "shock therapy" with little debate or 
analysis in order to avoid the inevitable political opposition to such policies. In fact, Topalova (2004, 
2005) shows that tariff changes are not strongly correlated with baseline industry characteristics such as 
productivity or skill intensity at the industry level. This observation is consistent with Gang and Pandey 
(1996) who analyze the determinants of tariffs prior to the 1991 reforms and argue that economic and 
political factors are not useful in explaining industry tariff levels in India at the time of the reform. 
Rather, they argue, tariffs prior to the 1991 reforms reflected India's second five year plan (passed in 
1955) and had not been substantively changed even as industries and the Indian economy changed.  
The 1991 reforms were incorporated directly into India's Eighth Five Year plan (1992-1997). 
Thus, tariff changes through 1997 are spelled out by the 1991 reform and outside of the usual political 
                                                 
9 The sources of tariff data are various publications of the Indian Ministry of Finance. 
10This crisis was in part triggered by the sudden increase in the oil prices due to the Gulf War in 1990, the drop in 
remittances from Indian workers in the Middle East, and the political uncertainty surrounding the fall of a coalition 
government and assassination of Rajiv Gandhi which undermined investor’s confidence. 
  8economy process. Figure 2 documents an increase in tariffs in some sectors subsequently to the end of 
this plan, which may reflect various political economy factors. Hence, we restrict our attention to tariff 
levels prior to the reform and to levels in 1997. That is, we assign the data from the 55th round of the 
NSS, the 1997 tariff level. This reflects the idea that adjustment to tariffs is gradual (we do not expect a 
tariff change in 1991 to have an immediate impact that works through employment), and the importance 
of using tariff variation that is externally imposed.  
One potential concern with relying on tariff changes alone is that tariffs may be correlated with 
non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs). NTB have historically played a large role in Indian trade policy. 
They were gradually removed over the 1990s as a part of the Eighth Five Year plan but more slowly 
than tariffs. We focus on tariffs alone because they are more transparent and easier to measure 
comparably across industries and time than NTBs. In addition, NTB data is not readily available at a 
very detailed industry level. The limited available data on NTBs suggest that tariffs and NTBs are 
positively correlated during this period (higher tariffs, higher NTBs: Topalova 2005) albeit with a time 
lag. Given this positive correlation, it is possible in theory that a portion of the adjustment costs 
attributed to tariffs may owe to NTB declines, although some robustness checks suggest this not to be 
necessarily the case (see the discussion around table 4 below). Despite the slower NTB reforms, the 
tariff changes considered herein are mirrored in increases in imports. The share of merchandise trade in 
GDP increased from about 10% in 1986/87 to about 19% in the late 1990s. 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Measuring Tariff Protection 
Most studies that use micro level data to evaluate trade reforms focus on their impact through 
employment. These studies typically correlate industry trade or trade policy changes with industry 
employment/wages, or they interact the industry level measures of trade policy with the geographic 
concentration of industries to construct an employment weighted regional exposure of trade reforms (see 
Harrison (2006), Goldberg and Pavcnik (forthcoming) for surveys). As illustrated in Section 2, by 
measuring the effect of tariff changes through employment, this approach emphasizes the mechanisms 
that work through returns to education, family income, and child employment while missing the effect 
on consumption and inputs prices. We return to the latter mechanisms in Section 5.5. 
  9In this study, we rely on India's considerable geographic diversity in how families are affected 
by the national tariff changes. India is divided into almost 450 districts.
11 Districts differ in their 
industrial composition before the 1991 reforms. Our identification strategy exploits this geographic 
heterogeneity within India in exposure to tariff protection. The interaction between the share of a 
district’s population employed by various industries on the eve of trade reforms and the reduction in 
tariffs in these industries provides a measure of the change in a district’s tariff protection. We use the 
phrase "district tariff" to refer to the district level measure of employment based exposure to national 
tariff rates. Product tariffs do not themselves vary at the district level. 
  In particular, district d’s "district tariff" at time t is measured by the 1991 district-specific 
industry employment weighted average of nominal, national, industry ad-valorem tariffs at time t. For 
each industry i in district d, we compute employment Empi,d using India’s 1991 population and housing 












for rural areas that are normalized to 
sum to one for each district.
12 The district tariff at time t is the district-specific employment weighted 
sum of industry-specific national tariffs (i.e. tariffi,t): 
(5)     ,, * dt i d it
i
tariff tariff ω =∑
It is important to emphasize that this computation uses district specific employment weights based on 
industrial composition that is determined prior to trade reform. Thus, changes in employment over time 
that are the result of tariff changes do not affect our measure of exposure to the tariff reforms. 
  The above tariff measure takes into account employment in traded industries and non-traded 
industries such as services, trade, transportation, construction, and growing of cereals and oilseeds 
within a district.
13 Non-traded industries are assigned zero tariffs in all years,
14 resulting in average 
district tariffs, substantially lower than average tariffs on traded goods. The top row of Table 2 
                                                 
11The district is an administrative unit within the state, slightly smaller in geographical area than the typical American 
county. Boundaries of the districts have been relatively constant since colonial times, though many of the older districts 
have been split into two or more modern districts. 
12Because the Indian census does not distinguish among various subcategories of agriculture, employment information 
on subcategories of agriculture from the 1987 (i.e. 43
rd) round of the National Sample Survey is used. 
13Topalova (2005) argues that the latter two categories should be treated as non-traded because all product lines within 
cereals and oilseeds were canalized (i.e. imports were allowed only by the state trading monopoly) until 2000 and the 
tariffs on all product lines under the growing of cereals are zero throughout the period of our study. 
14 Since our identification strategies relies on the within-district change in trade exposure, it does not matter whether we 
assign non traded industries to have 0 or infinite tariffs as long as these tariffs do not change over time.  
  10summarizes the time trend in the average district tariff between 1987 and 1999/2000 for the years in 
which we have household survey data.
15 The average district tariff in rural areas decreased from 8 
percent in 1987 to 2.5 percent in 2000, a decline of nearly 70 percent. 
District tariffs and tariff changes are heavily influenced by the prevalence of employment in 
non-traded sectors. By construction, everything else equal, districts with greater share of employment in 
non-traded sector have lower district tariffs and lower tariff changes, thus the difference between the 88 
percent average product tariff for 1987 in Figure 1 and the corresponding 8 percent average district tariff 
in Table 2. Subsequently, we create a measure of district tariffs that depends only on employment in 
traded sectors. This measure is constructed along the same lines as the district tariff measure in (5), 
except that the weights use only the employment in traded sectors within a district. We call this the 
"traded tariff" for the district and label it  . This tariff measure is correlated with the district 
average tariff  , but variation in   is not determined mechanically by the size of the non-
traded sector. The second row of Table 2 documents the evolution in traded tariffs over the period of 
study: in rural areas, the average traded tariff declines from 88 percent in 1987 to 31 percent in 2000.
dt TrTariff
dt Tariff dt TrTariff
16  
In order for national tariff changes to have a differential impact on district outcomes through 
employment composition, the district must be the appropriate labor market from the household’s point 
of view. To the extent that the district is either too aggregate or too disaggregate, there will be 
measurement error in our measure of trade exposure. In treating the district as the relevant unit of 
analysis, we are following convention in the micro empirical literature on India (Rosenzweig and 
Evenson 1977, Rosenzweig 1982, Banerjee and Iyer 2005, Duflo and Pande 2007). Part of the reason for 
focusing on district level variation is that there is surprisingly little migration between districts (Das 
Gupta 1987, Topalova 2005, Munshi and Rosenzweig 2005). Topalova (2005) documents that, even in 
2000, less than 2 percent of rural adult males have moved into their current district of residence or 
between urban and rural areas within their district of residence during the last 10 years.
17 Temporary 
                                                 
15The tariff measure matched to 1987/88 NSS is based on tariff information for 1987. No detailed data on tariffs is 
available prior to 1987, but there were no major trade reforms prior to 1991. The tariff measure linked to 1999/00 NSS 
round is based on tariff information for 1997. 
16 Tariffs decline in agricultural, mining, and manufacturing sectors. The bottom two rows of table 2 report average 
district tariffs using only traded agricultural sectors (row 3) and traded mining and manufacturing sectors (row 4).  
17 Munshi and Rosenzweig (2005) argue that the critical role played by mutual insurance arrangements within sub-caste 
networks explain why there is so little permanent mobility in India. Das Gupta (1987) argues that implicit ownership of 
common property that is conditional on residency and exclusive of new migrants is also important. 
  11migration of individual household members for work is probably much more common, although 
temporary out migrants are supposed to be in the household roster and therefore in our dataset. That 
said, as a robustness check, we also conduct the analysis at the region level. 
4.2 Empirical Framework 
Our empirical strategy is straightforward. Indian districts vary in their exposure to trade reforms based 
on the composition of employment prior to the reforms. We compare how schooling and child labor 
changed in districts that differ in the tariff decline that they experience. While we control for individual 
correlates with the detailed micro data of the NSS, it is the district panel dimension of the data that 
generates the variation used to identify the effects of tariff declines on schooling.   is our measure 
of the district d's tariff at time t and is constructed as described in Section 4.1. Let 
dt Tariff
jhdt y denote an 
indicator for participation in activity y (for example, attend school as detailed in Section 3.1) by child j 
living in household h in district d at time (survey round) t. Our base specification is then: 
(6)  () 01 1 , jhdt dt jt jt ht t d jhdt yT a r i f f A G H β βπ α τ λ =+ + + + ++ ε
)
 
where  ( , jtj t A G π is a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender indicator, and their 
interactions.   is a vector of household characteristics that might affect household choice of child 
activity such as caste, religion, the head's gender, age, literacy, and education.  
ht H
1 β , the coefficient on 
district tariffs, is our main coefficient of interest. 
We control for the average changes in the activities of children across all districts between 1987 
and 1999/2000 with a post-reform (survey-round) fixed effect  t τ . Consequently, the coefficient on 
tariffs does not capture any aggregate effects of Indian tariff reforms. Indian districts differ in their 
endowments, schooling facilities, accessibility, geography, etc. and these attributes are potentially 
correlated with tariffs (or industrial composition) and schooling/child labor. We control for time-
invariant district characteristics with a district fixed effect d λ  and thus use within district variation in 
tariff exposure to identify the impact of Tariffdt on activity y. Because district tariffs are constructed with 
constant pre-liberalization employment weights, the econometric work is attempting to build the 
counterfactual of how schooling would have changed if the only parameter differing from the pre-
liberalization values were national tariffs on imported goods. Everything else equal, a positive value of 
  12the coefficient on tariff  1 β  in (6) would suggest that tariff declines are associated with decreases in 
schooling relative to a national trend. 
The coefficient on tariff 1 β in (6) is identified under the assumption that unobserved district-
specific time varying shocks that affect schooling/child labor are uncorrelated with changes in district 
tariffs over time. Changes in district tariffs capture the interaction of changes in industry tariffs at the 
national level and initial industrial composition in a district.  Consequently, only differential time-trends 
in schooling that are correlated with both baseline industrial composition and national level tariff 
changes could be a source of bias.  This type of bias is less likely to be a concern in traded sectors.  As 
discussed in Section 3.2, the usual concerns with the political economy of protection are less severe in 
the case of the 1991 Indian reforms.  There was little scope until 1997 for lobbying groups to influence 
tariff changes, and the tariffs in place at the time of reform only weakly reflected contemporaneous 
economic and political circumstances.  A more pressing concern noted in Section 4.1 is that changes in 
the district tariff measure in (5) depend in part on the size of the non-traded sector in a given district.  
The baseline size of the non-traded sector in a district could be associated with differential time trends in 
our outcomes of interest.   
We address this concern in three ways. First, we allow for different time effects across districts 
based on the pre-reform conditions in a district, such as district's employment composition at a more 
aggregate level than the one used in the construction of district tariffs. Pre-reform conditions that are 
interacted with post reform indicator include the share of workers in a district employed in agriculture, 
mining, manufacturing, trade, transport, services (construction is the omitted category), the share of a 
district’s population that is scheduled caste/tribe, the share of literate population in a district, and state 
labor laws indicators as defined in Besley and Burgess (2004). Second, we instrument for district tariff 
with district tariff on traded goods,   (described in Section 4.1), which is not mechanically 
influenced by the size of the non-traded sector. Thus, our main specification is: 
dt TrTariff
(7)  () 01 1 ,* jhdt dt jt jt ht d t t d jhdt yT a r i f f A G H D β βπ α δ τ τ λ =+ + + + + ++ ε
t
 
where * d D τ  is the vector of pre-reform district characteristics interacted with post-reform 
indicator and   is instrumented with  . The tariff on traded goods is strongly 
correlated with the overall tariff for the district. First stage results of the IV regression are reported 
dt Tariff dt TrTariff
  13in appendix table 2. Third, in robustness section below, we take several additional steps to test 
whether our basic findings based on equation (7) stem from latent time trends. In section 5.2 we test 
for correlation between the tariff changes and pre-reform changes in outcome variables. We also 
allow for the pre-reform changes in outcome variables to have a time-varying impact in (7). In 
section 5.3, we verify that the results on schooling and literacy are restricted only to children of 
school age during the 1990s. The results from these robustness checks are all consistent with our 
basic findings, to which we turn next.  
5. Main Findings 
5.1. School Attendance  
In rural India in the 1990s, school attendance increased by less in districts that experienced larger tariff 
declines. This is apparent in Table 3 which contains the basic findings. Column 1 shows the coefficient 
on district tariff and on the post-reform indicator from the OLS estimation of equation (6). Column 2 
presents the IV estimates of equation (7), the main specification of the paper. With all of the included 
time trends, the post-reform effect is not reported in column 2 and in all subsequent regressions that 
include differential time trends across districts. In all specifications, standard errors are clustered at the 
state-year level.
18  
Both the OLS and IV estimates suggest that larger tariff declines in a district are associated with 
lower schooling attendance (relative to national trends).  It is important to interpret this in the context of 
the impressive progress in school attendance throughout India during this period. As the coefficient on 
the post-reform indicator in column 1 suggests, in districts that experience no change in tariff, the 
regression adjusted probability a child is in school increases by 17 percentage points between 1987 and 
2000. Everything else equal, the average district tariff decline (.05) is associated with a 2 percentage 
point decline in schooling relative to the national baseline. Thus, a district with the average tariff change 
experienced a 15 percentage point increase in schooling, 12 percent below the national trend.
19  
  The decline in district tariffs varies between 0 to 59 percentage points. In the district 
experiencing the largest tariff change, the probability that a child attends school actually falls by 4.5 
                                                 
18We have one year of data prior to the reform and one year of data after the reform, 13 years later. 
19 No single sector is driving our findings. We observe this result (attenuated schooling increases with larger tariff 
declines) in 76 of the 233 traded sectors when the reduced form of our main specification is estimated using district's 
exposure to tariffs for each sector separately.  
  14percentage points after the trade reforms (compared to the 17 percentage point rise observed in districts 
with no tariff change). However, as the standard deviation of the average tariff change (-0.055) is rather 
small (0.06), extreme tariff changes where the implied effects predict absolute declines in schooling 
between 1987 and 2000 are not typical. For almost all districts, the observed tariff changes are not large 
enough to reverse the progress in schooling and child labor reduction in the 1990s in India.  
5.2 Robustness of Basic Findings 
The tariff - schooling relationship captured so far would be biased if the measure of tariff changes in a 
district is correlated with omitted district-level time-varying factors that affect school attendance. We 
examine whether districts with different industrial compositions and tariff changes had similar pre-
reform time trends in school attendance. We test whether the findings are confounded by other reforms, 
concurrent to trade liberalization. Finally, we investigate whether investments in school infrastructure 
are correlated with the district’s exposure to trade reforms.  
We first focus on pre-existing trends in outcome variables. We directly test whether our results 
reflect pre-existing time trends in schooling that are correlated with post-reform changes in tariffs by 
estimating equation (7) with data from the 38
th (1983) and 43
rd (1987-88) round of the NSS, both prior 
to the 1991 reforms. This analysis can be performed only using tariff variation at the region level as 
district identifiers are not available in the 38
th round of the NSS.
20  We assign pre-reform tariffs (1987) 
to 38
th round and post-reform tariffs (1997) to 43
rd round. The results of this exercise are presented in 
column 4. In column 3, we provide a region level variant of column 2 for comparison. If the pre-existing 
trends in school attendance were correlated with the region's tariff reduction shock, then the coefficient 
on regional tariff in data before trade reform (column 4) will be similar to the coefficient estimated with 
data before and after the reform (column 3). In fact, the pre-reform coefficient is opposite in sign and 
much smaller in magnitude. As an additional check in column (5), we allow the pre-reform trend in 
schooling in a region to have a time-varying effect (we interact the trend with a post reform indicator) in 
our main specification in equation (7). Both the magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated 
impact of tariff remain similar to those reported in column 2. 
During the 1990s, India implemented several other reforms concurrent with trade liberalization. 
Some of the more notable reforms include a removal of licenses regulating operations in various 
                                                 
20India is divided into 77 regions and a region is a collection of several districts. Regional tariffs are created in a manner 
that parallels the creation of district-level tariffs. 
  15industries (Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilliboti 2006), relaxation of entry regulation of foreign direct 
investment, and substantial reforms in the financial and banking sectors. Following Topalova (2005), we 
construct district employment-weighted share of industries subject to industrial licensing and district 
employment-weighted share of industries open to FDI (see data appendix). The number of bank 
branches per capita in a district controls for the possibly confounding effect of banking reforms. In 
columns 2-4 of Table 4, we estimate equation (7) with these additional controls.  Neither the magnitude 
nor the statistical significance of the coefficient on district tariff is sensitive to including these time-
varying district measures of reforms. We view these reform variables simply as controls and the 
coefficients on them do not warrant a causal interpretation. We also verify that the results are robust to 
the inclusion of exports, by including the district employment-weighted industry exports (column 5). In 
sum, we find little evidence that our findings reflect other reforms concurrent with the 1991 tariff 
reductions. 
Over the 1990s, substantial policy attention has been directed towards the promotion of 
schooling in India, which could confound our results if schooling policy changes are correlated with the 
district’s exposure to trade reforms.
21 However, there is no reason to suspect that programs like 
Operation Blackboard (Chin 2005), the District Primary Education Project launched in November 1994 
(Pandey 2001), or mid-day meals (Dreze and Kingdon 2001) are correlated with district tariff changes.
22 
We examine education infrastructure changes using data on primary schools per capita from the 1991 
census and the 7
th (2002) All India Education Survey (AIES) and additional detail on schooling facilities 
at the district level from the 6th (1993) and 7th AIES.
23 We mimic our main specification and regress 
several measures of district school quantity and quality on the corresponding district tariff, a post-reform 
indicator, pre-reform district characteristics interacted with the post-reform indicator, and instrument for 
tariffs with traded tariffs. The results are in Table 5. None of the correlations between schooling 
                                                 
21 The absence of any major policy interventions related to child labor in the 1990s is a major source of grief for child 
labor activists in India. Most of the actions that occurred in the later part of the decade involved listing certain types of 
employment as "worst-forms" and thereby prohibited. Enforcement of these regulations appears to have begun as early 
as 2003 in some states although few children in our dataset are involved in these activities. 
22 In unreported regressions, we estimate our main IV specification (7) using as dependent variables household 
responses on the prevalence of scholarships, free mid-day meals, and free tuition from the 42nd and 52nd (small 
sample) rounds of the NSS. Estimates of the changes in these aspects of schooling costs with tariffs are close to zero in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. 
23 The 6th round of the AIES is the earliest available at the district level. As it occurs slightly more than a year after the 
initial tariff reforms are implemented, we treat it as a baseline. However, due to the ambiguous timing, results in 
columns 3-6 of Table 5 should be viewed with caution. 
  16infrastructure and tariffs are statistically significant. If anything, larger tariff declines are associated with 
an increase in the number of primary schools and the number of primary schools per capita, and a 
decline in pupil teacher ratios. If more schools (Duflo 2001) or lower pupil-teacher ratios (Case and 
Deaton 1999) lead to increased schooling, our estimate of the impact of tariffs on schooling would be 
downward biased. Overall, these findings are consistent with our review of education and child labor 
policy in India over the 1990s – while there is considerable activity, there are no district level 
interventions that are obviously correlated with district tariff changes. 
Not surprisingly, controlling for the number of primary schools per capita in a district in our 
basic specification has little overall effect on our estimates of how schooling changes with tariff declines 
(Table 4, column 6). The number of primary schools per capita is positively (but insignificantly) 
correlated with school attendance, however its inclusion does not affect the coefficient on tariffs. 
Column 7 of Table 4 estimates equation (7) controlling for the number of primary schools per capita in a 
district and all other district measures of time-varying policy.  The estimate of tariff coefficient barely 
changes. 
5.3 Literacy  
If districts that were subject to larger tariff declines experienced smaller increases in school attendance, 
we should also observe diminished literacy in those districts relative to the national trend. However, this 
effect should be concentrated only among cohorts who were of school going age during the 1990s. 
Trade reforms should have no impact on literacy of those who had already completed their schooling by 
1991. If most children engaged in primary school in rural India are age 15 or younger, it is implausible 
to observe tariff effects on individuals above age 25 in 2001. 
  We use the 1991 and 2001 rural population census to examine the correlation between tariffs 
and literacy by age. Both censuses report district level aggregates of literacy. We regress literacy rates 
for each age group separately (for example, 14 year olds) in a district d at time t on the district tariff, 
post-reform indicator, district fixed effects, pre-reform district conditions (the share of workers in a 
district employed in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, trade, transport, services, the share of a 
district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, and state labor laws indicators) interacted with the 
post-reform indicator, and instrument for tariffs with traded tariffs. The estimated coefficient on the 
tariff measure and the 95 percent confidence interval for each age group is plotted on Figure 3. 
  17  The results on the impact of tariffs on literacy mirror the school attendance results. Our basic 
results in Table 3 compare the schooling attendance of children ages 10-14 in 1999 with that of children 
ages 10-14 in 1987. In Figure 3 we observe that larger tariff declines are associated with lower literacy 
rates for children 10-14 in 2001 relative to children 10-14 in 1991.
24  The decline in literacy with tariff 
declines (relative to the time trends) is similar in magnitude to what is observed for school attendance in 
the NSS.  The reduction in literacy with tariff declines extends to the 15-19 age group. Children 15-19 in 
2001 were educated during the tariff adjustment process (they were 5-9 in 1991). Hence, the association 
between tariff declines and the literacy of this older cohort is consistent with our basic findings. 
Perhaps the most important finding in Figure 3 is the result from the falsification exercise. We 
do not observe any false treatment effects in older populations whose schooling should largely be 
completed by the time of the reforms. The correlation between tariffs and the literacy for older 
populations are close to zero. For example, an individual age 20 at the time of reforms is unlikely to 
have his literacy affected by the 1991 reforms. He would be age 30 in 2001, and we observe little 
correlation between tariff changes and literacy rates for the age 30 population. The association between 
tariffs and schooling is concentrated in the populations that should be affected by the reforms. 
5.4 Selective Migration 
Selective migration might be a source of bias in our school attendance findings if families with a greater 
propensity to educate their children move away from districts with larger tariff declines.  Permanent out 
of district migration is very low, and we do not directly observe large population movements associated 
with tariff declines. In the first three columns of Table 6, we mimic our basic approach in equation (7) 
using log population counts by district as a dependent variable and regress it on a district tariff, post-
reform indicator, pre-reform district characteristics interacted with the post-reform indicator, and 
instrument for tariffs with traded tariffs.  We do not observe significant changes in population counts 
with tariff changes. 
  It is possible that within a relatively fixed population base, there is a change in the composition 
of the population driving our findings.  In the last three columns of table 6, we estimate the above 
specification with the ratio of males to females in a district as the dependent variable.  We find no 
evidence of significant changes in the gender mix with tariff variation.  Figure 3 is also informative on 
                                                 
24One possible mechanism for the schooling attendance findings is the sustained impact of a transitory shock in utero, 
but the persistence across treated ages in Figure 3 is not what that explanation would predict. 
  18whether there are changes in the literacy of the adult population.  Namely, if tariff declines lead to a 
departure of literate adults (who are more likely to educate their children), then we should observe 
effects of tariffs on the literacy of the adult population.  The absence of such evidence in Figure 3, 
coupled with the insignificant evidence on population counts and sex ratios documented in table 6, is 
inconsistent with substantive changes in population and its composition associated with employment 
tariffs.  
5.5 Other trade channels 
The focus on an employment based measure of exposure to tariff is standard in the trade literature. This 
reflects the belief that it is the labor market where the adjustment costs will be most evident. However, 
tariff changes will also influence households through consumption and intermediate input prices. These 
consumption and intermediate input channels are likely important for the aggregate effects of tariff 
reductions, but they do not appear to be a substantive source of bias in our estimates of the relationship 
between schooling and declines in final product protection on employment.  
Tariff-induced declines in consumer prices should have an income effect that increases 
schooling and a substitution effect that encourages families to consume more consumption goods at the 
expense of schooling and leisure. The consumption effects are absorbed by the post-reform indicator in 
equation (7) if individuals in different districts consume the same consumption bundle and prices of 
goods equalize across districts. For falling consumer prices to generate our findings above, consumption 
bundles would need to vary with the composition of employment and the substitution effect of consumer 
price changes would have to dominate the income effect. We find no hint of this in table 7. We estimate 
our main specification (7) by including a district specific consumption weighted tariff as a regressor (see 
data appendix for construction). Column 1 of table 7 reproduces our main specification from table 3. 
Column 2 reports results when we estimate our main specification (7) with consumption tariff as the 
main independent variable of interest, and column 3 reports estimates of the coefficients of interest 
when we include both the employment weighted tariff and the consumption tariff in equation 7.
25 The 
                                                 
25 Two important caveats regarding the consumption results need to be discussed. First, they are imprecise. The results 
in column 2 of table 7 are consistent with an increase in schooling of 17 percentage points or a decline of 8 percentage 
points at the mean consumption tariff change relative to a district with no change. Second, we do not instrument for 
consumption tariffs. Bias might arise if tariff changes are larger on products that are consumed disproportionately in 
rich communities. However, no obvious solution presents itself. 
  19estimated impact of employment weighted tariff on school attendance conditional on consumption tariff 
in column 3 is very similar to what we obtain in our main specification.  
  For declining intermediate input prices to generate our findings above, declining input prices 
would need to lower family incomes or increase child labor's productivity. This later channel is unlikely, 
because the changes in schooling do not appear to be driven by increases in child employment in market 
work (section 6.2). To explore whether our results reflect the effect of tariffs on input prices rather than 
declining final product protection, we estimate our main specification in (7) using the district's exposure 
to tariffs on inputs as a regressor (see data appendix). Input tariffs suffer from the same concerns as our 
employment tariff, and we create an analogous instrument of input tariffs for traded goods. The results 
are presented in column 4 and 5 of Table 7.  Though the estimates are extremely imprecise, input tariff 
declines are associated with higher levels of schooling (column 4), suggesting that the now cheaper 
inputs either substitute for child labor or have a positive income effect. The estimates of the coefficient 
on employment weighted tariff conditional on input tariffs and consumption tariffs (column 5) increase 
slightly, but they are not statistically different from basic results in column 1. Overall, our basic results 
do not appear to be driven by other trade channels working through either consumption or inputs.  
6. Mechanisms 
Why do districts with more concentrated pre-reform employment in industries that experience larger 
tariff declines observe smaller increases in school attendance (relative to the national trend)? The 
conceptual framework in Section 2 suggests that declines in returns to education, increases in child's 
economic contribution to household/child labor demand, or declines in living standards/increases in 
poverty in communities where employment lost tariff protection may be responsible. The analysis below 
finds little evidence in favor of declining returns to education or increases in child labor demand. 
Instead, the observed declines in schooling reflect increases in poverty (relative to national baseline) in 
districts where employment lost final product protection. The observed connection between poverty, 
schooling, and child labor seems to be driven by schooling costs. 
  206.1 Returns to Education 
If tariff declines lead to a relative reduction in the returns to education in districts that were more 
exposed to the reforms, schooling will decline with tariffs.
26 Households might gauge returns to 
schooling both by assessing school quality and by observing the labor market. We have already seen 
evidence against a strong school quality decline correlated with tariff changes (Table 5). In fact, pupil-
teacher ratio changes are consistent with increasing school quality when tariffs decline. In this section, 
we consider whether there is evidence of decreases in the returns to education in either the expenditure 
or adult employment data. Because of innumerable measurement problems, we do not attempt to 
directly measure returns to education and pursue a more inferential approach.
27
First, we compare per capita expenditures of households with literate and illiterate heads of 
household as a measure of the return to education.
28 This assumes that individuals infer future returns to 
education by comparing the living standards of the literate to those of the illiterate. Given the high levels 
of illiteracy in rural India, literacy is potentially the most obvious measure of education that can be 
observed outside of an individual's household. Neighbors are more likely to know whether someone can 
read or write than whether he has completed 3 or 4 years of education.  
We relate the relative expenditures of literate and illiterate households in a district to the 
employment weighted tariff using an approach parallel to equation (7). We regress the ratio of per capita 
expenditure in literate households to illiterate households in a district at time t on a district tariff, post-
reform indicator, pre-reform district characteristics interacted with the post-reform indicator, and 
instrument for tariffs with traded tariffs. Our findings are in Table 8.  Each column header indicates the 
dependent variable. Standard errors are large relative to the estimated coefficients, but the negative sign 
on the tariff coefficient in all but one specification is most consistent with increases in the expenditures 
of the literate relative to that of the illiterate with tariff declines.
29 We observe a similar finding when 
                                                 
26 For this to be the mechanism behind the observed correlation between tariffs and schooling, returns to education need 
to vary at the district level. Hence, we discuss returns to education under this assumption. 
27 Measuring returns to education for each district is a challenge. Current labor market returns may not be a good proxy 
for expected future returns. The observed average returns may not equal the marginal return relevant for a family’s 
decision-making. Estimates of returns based on observed wages will be biased by non-random selection into wage 
work. In addition, we face a data problem: information on wages is missing for most individuals in our baseline data. In 
general, around 30 percent of individuals report working for wages in rural areas in various NSS rounds. However, only 
7 percent of individuals report wages in rural areas in 43
rd round of NSS. 
28 We thank Esther Duflo for this suggestion. 
29 There are two ways to measure per capita expenditures in the NSS data. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 we use per capita 
expenditure measures from the detailed expenditure modules (Schedule 1). There is a substantive questionnaire change 
  21we split the sample by primary school completion rather than literacy of household head (columns 5 and 
6). Overall, the evidence in table 8 is more consistent with increasing, rather than decreasing, returns to 
education.  
Adult employment changes are also consistent with increasing returns to education. We infer 
what might be happening to returns to schooling by examining the employment of adult males (ages 25-
50) in wage work by literacy status and tariffs.  The changes in wage employment associated with tariff 
declines are informative about changes in the return to education under strong assumptions. Assume 
labor-supply is approximately linear and that its slope is positive and roughly the same for literate and 
illiterate men. Tariffs might affect returns to education by differentially affecting labor demand for 
literate workers and thereby the wage gap between literate and illiterate workers. Declining returns to 
education with tariff declines (lower relative wages of the literate) would imply increases in 
employment of illiterate men relative to the literate population. In fact, we observe the opposite in the 
formal wage sector.  
We estimate equation 7 separately for illiterate and literate adult males ages 25-50, using 
participation in wage work and the number of days in wage work as dependent variables.
30 The results 
are reported in table 9 for illiterate (panel A) and literate (panel B) adult males.  Each column header 
indicates the dependent variable.  Tariff declines are associated with increases in participation (column 
1) and days worked (column 2) in wage work for literate men and declines in wage work for illiterate 
men. Given the magnitudes of these estimates, the rise in days worked in wage work for literate men 
reflects an increase in days in wage work beyond the rise in participation in the wage sector.
31
In sum, while our inference is limited by measurement issues, the expenditure, adult 
employment, and school quality data are more supportive of increasing rather than decreasing returns to 
education with tariff declines. Thus, we find little evidence that declines in the returns to education play 
a substantive role in our findings. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
between rounds in this module that is a cause for concern if recall biases or purchase frequencies differ with literacy (or 
primary school completion in columns 5 and 6). As a robustness check, we replicate our approach using the household 
per capita expenditure reported in the Employment and Unemployment Schedule 10 of the NSS that does not suffer 
from this problem in columns 3 and 4. 
30 We use adult characteristics as controls (rather than child characteristics) and do not include controls for the 
characteristics of household head. 
31 At the mean tariff decline, estimates from panel B, column 1 of table 9, imply a 1.1 percentage point increase in wage 
work. If days worked of existing wage workers did not change and all additional wage workers worked seven days a 
week, we should observe an additional 0.08 days worked per week with the average tariff change in column 2 of table 9. 
Instead, we observe an additional 0.13 days worked per week in wage work. 
  226.2 Child Labor Demand 
If tariff declines are associated with a rise in the child’s economic contribution foregone by schooling, 
w* in section 2, schooling could decline with tariffs. w* is the difference between the maximum income 
the household can achieve when the child does not and does attend school. The economic contribution 
foregone by schooling depends on the activities the child engages in, and we expect it to increase with 
higher wages in the formal wage labor market or positive productivity shocks to the family business or 
domestic production. We refer to the influence of w* on schooling as reflecting child labor demand. 
This is somewhat imprecise but emphasizes that the channel is distinct from the marginal utility of 
income. The evidence reviewed in this section provides little support for tariff declines being associated 
with increased earnings opportunities of children. 
Changes in the formal wage labor market are unlikely to be responsible for the observed 
attenuation of schooling improvements with tariff declines. First, child employment in formal wage 
sectors is infrequent. Second, child labor is typically modeled as a perfect substitute for unskilled 
(illiterate) labor (Basu and Van 1998 for example), and we do not observe increases in the adult wage 
sector employment for illiterates with tariff declines (table 9, panel A). Third, we examine the effect of 
district tariffs on child’s participation in several work categories, based on a question in NSS about the 
child’s principal usual activity (see section 3.1 for exact definitions). The findings from estimating (7) 
for each work category as a dependent variable are in Table 10. 
The data do not suggest that schooling declines are driven entirely by increased employment of 
children in market work. Although tariff declines are associated with (statistically insignificant) increase 
in the probability a child is observed working without attending school (column 3), this increase in work 
is not in market work where the child's labor is likely to result in additional household income (column 
4).  The increase in work is operating principally through domestic work (column 5). Moreover, the 
declines in schooling and increases in work without schooling are largest for girls (panel C), and out of 
school girls are less involved in cash-generating activities than out of school boys (The Probe Team 
1999).   
Rather, some of the declining school attendance with tariffs appears as increases in domestic 
work (such as cooking, cleaning, gathering water and wood) and even larger increases in children 
(especially boys) who do not report work as a principal usual activity and also do not attend school, i.e. 
  23“idle” children. Child time in domestic work may indirectly increase household income either through 
the goods produced in home production or complementarities of adult work in the formal labor market 
and child domestic work (i.e. the child’s domestic work allows the adult to earn in the labor market). 
Thus, domestic work can be an important component of the income foregone by schooling. However, 
while tariff declines could bring nationwide productivity improvements in domestic work (through 
cheaper inputs into domestic work that are complementary to child labor, for example), it is less clear 
why these improvements should vary with district's employment exposure to tariff reforms. Moreover, 
in unreported regressions we do not observe declines in domestic work among adults associated with 
lower tariffs. Hence, it seems unlikely that the rise in domestic work reflect children filling in for 
working parents.  
The increased presence of idle children in districts with greater tariff declines might simply 
reflect mismeasurement of child activities.  For example, some parents may not consider working 
around the house a principal activity. However, there is an economic explanation. If the marginal 
product of child’s labor in the various activities can become zero (or even negative), it can be optimal to 
not use all the available child time for domestic or household enterprise work.
32 In this case the child’s 
net economic contribution, w*, could be zero. Yet, families might still be better off keeping children out 
of school if the marginal utility from the returns to education falls short of the disutility associated with 
schooling costs as discussed in Section 2. In fact, it is plausible that the increased incidence of children 
in domestic work could reflect in part that domestic activities are a type of absorptive labor so that both 
the increase in idleness and rise in domestic work with tariff declines reflects the avoidance of schooling 
costs more than an actual economic contribution of the child. 
The above evidence suggests that children are not withdrawing from school to improve family 
incomes through bringing more cash to the household. We cannot exclude the possibility that a rise in 
the child's potential economic contribution in domestic work lies behind a fraction of the schooling 
results. However, the employment data are also consistent with the idea that the declines in schooling 
are largely driven by the avoidance of the direct and indirect costs of schooling to which we now turn.  
                                                 
32 This might occur in the presence of binding constraints on the availability of wage employment for children and if 
home enterprise and domestic work production functions are positive concave in child time in each activity. 
  246.3 Poverty 
If tariff declines are associated with increases in poverty (relative to national trends), schooling could 
decline (relative to national trends) with tariff declines.  Topalova (2005) finds that districts which were 
more exposed to trade reforms through employment experienced smaller poverty reduction than the 
national average. We first replicate this analysis and find that in addition to poverty, it extends to 
agricultural wages as well (a strong correlate of poverty). We then bring additional evidence which 
suggests that schooling costs are at the core of the observed relationship between poverty, schooling, 
and child labor.  
Table 11 documents the relationship between employment weighted tariff declines and poverty. 
Columns 1 and 2 replicate Topalova (2005) findings for rural areas by regressing a district level poverty 
measure at time t ( headcount ratio in column 1 and poverty gap in column 2), on the employment 
weighted tariff, district fixed effects, post-reform indicator, and the interaction of the initial conditions 
in a district with the post-reform indicator. As usual, we instrument for district tariff with district tariff 
on traded goods. For the district with the average change in trade exposure, the liberalization of tariffs 
increases the headcount rate by 2.7 percentage points (nearly 10 percent) relative to a district with no 
tariff change. Column 3 shows that declines in tariffs are associated with declines in wages of 
agricultural workers, a high correlate of poverty (Burgess and Pande 2005, Duflo and Pande 2007). 
Lower living standards may force families to pull children out of school if there are direct costs 
associated with going to school or children are needed to contribute to the family income.  
The responses of child labor and idleness to tariff declines discussed above suggest that saving 
on schooling costs (rather than increasing child earnings in formal labor markets) is likely the 
underlying link between tariffs and schooling. This is consistent with the Public Report On Basic 
Education in India (1999) that found “schooling is too expensive” is the most frequently cited reason a 
child was never enrolled in school and one of the two most cited reasons children were withdrawn from 
school. This answer is plausible despite the fact that primary school tuition is theoretically free in 
government run schools. Talik (2002) calculates that other direct costs including fees, books, uniforms, 
tutoring, and transportation costs are about 7 percent of average annual income for families in the 
poorest decile. Most of these costs need to be incurred in a short time window at the beginning of the 
  25school year, and these cost estimates do not include the considerable indirect costs associated with the 
child’s need to conform to the social norms of students in the school. 
Below, we present some additional evidence consistent with this schooling costs explanation. 
First, we observe that in districts with larger tariff declines, there is a relative increase in households 
taking out loans to finance education and a decline in the amount spent on education. This evidence is in 
Table 12, where we mimic our preferred specification (7). Even though school attendance trends are 
attenuated in districts with larger tariff declines, we observe a higher incidence of households taking out 
formal and informal loans for educational purposes in the more affected districts (column 1). In 
addition, we observe that tariff declines are associated with declines in household educational 
expenditure per capita (column 2), the log of household educational expenditure per capita plus one 
(column 3), and the share of educational expenditure in the household budget (column 4). This evidence 
corroborates the school attendance results and is consistent with the schooling costs argument as 
households are spending less on education with tariff declines.  
If the observed declines in school attendance reflect poverty induced saving on schooling costs, 
one would expect tariff declines to be associated with smaller declines in school attendance in areas 
where going to school is less costly. The 42
nd and 52
nd thin rounds of the NSS contain more detailed 
information on education and schooling costs. In particular, using the 42
nd round (1986) as our pre-
reform period, we compute the prevalence of free tuition, the share of children obtaining free mid day 
meals at school, and the share of children with scholarships in a district.
33  We interact these pre-reform 
aspects of school costs with district tariff and add it as a regressor in our main specification (7). Table 13 
contains the results. We use school attendance and enrollment as our dependent variables in columns 1 
and 2, respectively.
34  Although not all interactions with schooling costs are statistically significant, the 
negative signs of the coefficients suggest that declines in schooling relative to the national trend are 
smaller in districts with smaller baseline schooling costs. That is, the greater the prevalence of free 
midday meals (panel A), scholarships (panel B), or free tuitions (panel C), the smaller the decline in 
schooling associated with the tariff changes. Of course, the above measures of the schooling costs are 
non-random, but the evidence seems consistent with the importance of schooling cost. 
                                                 
33 These are only three components of schooling costs. They do not capture the costs of clothing, books, materials, and 
other aspects of “fitting in” at school which may be the most important parts of school costs.  
34The 52
nd round collects data on both school attendance in enrollment, while the 42
nd round provides only data on 
enrollment. In column 1, we assume that enrollment equals school attendance in the 42
nd round.  
  26In sum, tariff declines attenuate poverty reduction and agricultural wage gains relative to the 
national trends. At the same time, we observe increases in child work (mainly driven by increases in 
domestic work) that are smaller than the declines in schooling, and a rise in idleness. Tariff declines are 
also associated with increases in educational loans and declines in education expenditure and education 
expenditure as a share of household budget. These observations, coupled with suggestive heterogeneous 
effect of tariffs on school attendance that vary with baseline schooling costs, point to schooling costs as 
an important impediment to school attendance in times of slower (relative to trend) progress in poverty 
alleviation.   
6.4 Poverty Elasticity of Schooling and Child Labor 
The results of the previous sections suggest that employment weighted tariff changes seem to affect 
schooling primarily through their impact on poverty. In this section, we make a strong assumption that 
the employment weighted traded tariffs affect schooling and child labor only through their impact on 
local poverty rates. We then use the traded tariff as an instrument for poverty rates to estimate the 
poverty elasticity of schooling and child labor. In particular, in a setting that parallels equation (7), we 
regress schooling/child labor on a district poverty rate, our usual controls, and instrument for local 
poverty with traded tariffs in a district.
35 The exclusion restriction necessary for this exercise would 
obviously be invalid if the traded tariff had an impact on returns to education or labor demand for 
children. 
  Estimates of the poverty elasticity of schooling and child labor implied by this exclusion 
restriction are in Table 14. In columns 1-6, we report results where the headcount ratio is instrumented 
by the traded tariff; in the remaining columns, the poverty gap is instrumented with the traded tariff. 
Column 1 implies that a 1 percentage point fall in the district's head count rate would increase the 
probability that a child attends school by 0.7 percentage points. The same decline in the poverty rate is 
associated with a 0.3 percentage points decline in the probability of a child working (column 2), albeit 
this effect is imprecisely estimated. The small poverty elasticity of market work (column 4) relative to 
the poverty elasticity of domestic work and idle status is consistent with our discussion above that the 
tariff-schooling relationship is driven mostly by schooling costs rather than labor demand. 
                                                 
35 These estimates are based on children in districts in states in which poverty lines are available. The results are robust 
to including children in all states, with poverty lines assumed to be equal to neighboring states’ poverty lines when 
missing. 
  27  There are some interesting gender differences in our estimates of the elasticity of schooling and 
work with respect to poverty (Panel B and C). In general, both female schooling and work is more 
sensitive to poverty than is male schooling and work. For boys, higher poverty is associated with more 
market work, domestic work, and idle status. However, higher poverty is associated with less market 
work and more domestic and idle status for girls. We suspect that these gender differences in the poverty 
– market work relationship reflect something about the underlying status of girls in Indian households, 
and a more thorough future study of gender work roles in India would be of interest. That said, the main 
interesting finding for our study is that the response of girl's schooling and work to changes in poverty 
appears to be nearly double that of boys. 
If we take the pooled results (panel A) in Table 14 seriously, we can assess the role of poverty 
declines in India's progress on schooling in the 1990s. Headcount poverty rates fell from 37 percent in 
1987 to 24 percent in 1999 in rural India (Topalova 2005). Schooling increased from 55 percent of 
children 10-14 to 73 percent (Table 1). The estimates from column 1 of Table 14 thus imply that more 
than half of the increase in schooling in rural India in the 1990s can be explained by falling poverty. The 
fraction of children working as a principal usual activity declined from 25 percent in 1987 to 14 percent 
in 1999. Over one third of the decline in children who work without attending school can then be 
explained by falling poverty (column 3). The lower poverty elasticity of work than schooling is perfectly 
consistent with a theory that implies a greater income elasticity of schooling than work.  
7. Conclusion 
Much of the concern about trade liberalization focuses on the impact of the loss of protection on those 
currently employed in protected industries. Our study considers whether these short and medium-term 
adjustment costs of trade reform influence the schooling and work decisions of children.  Overall, in the 
1990s, rural India experienced a dramatic increase in schooling and decline in child labor.  However, 
rural districts where employment experienced larger changes in final product protection saw smaller 
improvements in schooling and declines in child labor relative to the national trend. The attenuation in 
schooling attendance trends associated with tariff declines is robust but not large in magnitude. A 
district without any change in final product protection experiences a 17 percentage point improvement 
in schooling rates for children 10-14 between 1987 and 2000. A district with the mean change in 
protection experiences a 15 percentage point improvement in schooling. 
  28The data suggest that the relationship between district exposure to trade reforms and schooling is 
driven by the poverty impact of declining tariffs: districts subject to larger tariff declines experienced 
slower poverty reduction. We do not find evidence of other obvious channels through which a loss of 
final product protection might affect schooling such as through declines in the returns to education or 
increases in child labor demand. Although we focus only on trade adjustment in this study, this finding 
of a link between trade and child time allocation working primarily through living standards is 
consistent with existing evidence from Vietnam's liberalization of rice export trade (Edmonds and 
Pavcnik 2005) and the cross-country evidence on child labor and aggregate trade flows (Edmonds and 
Pavcnik 2006).  In the present context, the negative elasticity of schooling with respect to poverty is 
most likely due to the household’s inability to cover the costs associated with sending a child to school 
in the absence of a well-functioning credit market. We have suggestive evidence that the impact of 
tariffs on schooling is larger in areas with high baseline schooling costs and relative increases in poverty 
are associated with a rise in the share of children who neither work nor attend school. Many studies have 
emphasized schooling costs as a major impediment to schooling. However, to our knowledge the 
important role schooling costs appear to play in explaining a strong poverty-schooling connection is 
novel in observational data. 
We cannot conclude from the strong empirical tariff – poverty – schooling connection that there 
is no impact of tariff changes on other factors that influence schooling. It could be that the poverty 
channel dwarfs these other channels in importance. However, if we assume that poverty is indeed the 
only way through which the decline in final product protection influenced schooling in India, then the 
resulting estimates of the poverty elasticity of schooling and child labor imply that half of the 
improvement in schooling and a third of the decline in child labor in rural India in the 1990s can be 
attributed to poverty declines. 
It is important to emphasize that these estimated effects do not capture the first order effect of 
trade opening on school attendance; rather, they reflect differential changes in schooling in areas with 
more exposure to the tariff reform through their employment composition after controlling for any 
economy wide changes associated with trade liberalization or other economic factors. Our focus on how 
districts are affected by tariff changes through the composition of employment prior to reform follows a 
tradition within the trade literature. Trade liberalization brings a wide array of benefits to a country 
  29through lower consumption prices, lower input prices, opportunities for specialization, and greater 
competition. However, theory predicts adjustment costs associated with the loss of protection on 
employment, and examples documenting the impact of these adjustment costs on labor in sectors 
loosing protection permeate the literature. Our primary contribution to this literature is to show that 
these short term adjustment costs affect young cohorts through their impact on schooling, child labor, 
and literacy. 
How substantive are the observed changes in human capital? Our estimates imply that the 
average tariff decline is associated with a 2 percentage points decline in schooling attendance relative to 
the improvements in districts with no change in tariffs. This 2 percentage point decline in schooling 
attendance is associated with a 2 percentage point (relative) decline in literacy (figure 3). In the 1999 
data used in this study, rural families with a literate adult head have roughly 25 percent higher 
expenditures per person than families without a literate adult head. This is not a causal estimate of the 
impact of literacy on per capita expenditures.  We treat it as an upper bound on what the causal effect 
might be. Thus, the two percentage point decline in literacy is associated with at most a 2.5 percent 
decline in per capita expenditures per year. Assuming that the return to literacy is constant over the life 
cycle, the decline in literacy is permanent, individuals become household heads at age 20 and continue 
to age 64 (life expectancy in India), and a discount rate of 6 percent, lifetime per capita expenditures are 
at most 41 percent lower relative to an individual living in a community not facing these adjustment 
costs. This calculation does not imply that the affected individual's life time per capita expenditures 
would be 41 percent higher without the tariff reductions. Trade liberalization has likely contributed to 
the aggregate increases in schooling and literacy in India during our period of study. However, this 
calculation suggests that the asymmetric incidence of the costs of these tariff declines are potentially 
considerable for affected individuals, and our calculations neglect any additional transmission to future 
generations. Thus, policy attention to the consequences of trade adjustment for human capital 
accumulation seems merited.  
 
Data Appendix  
Schooling and Child Labor variables.  Please see Section 3.1 for information on the NSS data. We use 
data from the 1991 and 2001 Indian Census about the share of population in a district that is literate by 
age/age groups.  
 
  30Population counts.  We use information from the 1991 and 2001 rural Indian Census on the number of 
people living in a district. This information is also provided by age/age group and by gender. 
 
Tariffs.  Please see Section 4.1 
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 is the employment of industry i in 
district d as a share total employment in district d. Data on employment by industry and by district is 
from the 1991 Indian Census. Industry exports for 1987 and 1997 are used for the 43
rd and 55
th round, 
respectively. Data on industry exports are from Annual Trade Database compiled by Tips Software 
Services Pvt. Ltd.  Exports are expressed in millions real Rupees. 
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 is the employment of industry i in district d 
as a share total employment in district d. FDI is an indicator equal to one if the industry is in the list of 
industries with automatic permission for foreign equity share up to 51 percent at time t. Data on the list 
of such industries is compiled from various publications of the Handbook of Industrial Statistics.  Data 
for 1987 and 1997 are used for the 43
rd and 55
th round, respectively.  
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 is the employment of 
industry i in district d as a share total employment in district d. License is an indicator equal to one if the 
industry is subject to licensing requirements at time t. Details on policies regarding industrial 
delicensing were compiled from various publications of the Handbook of Industrial Statistics.  Data for 
1987 and 1997 are used for the 43
rd and 55
th round, respectively.  
 
Number of Bank Branches.  The number of bank branches per capita is the number of bank branches 
in the district as reported in the Directory of Commercial Bank Offices in India (Volume 1), Reserve 
Bank of India, 2000, divided by the district population from the 1991 Indian Census. Note that the 
number of bank branches represents the total number for the district. Data on the number of bank 
branches in the rural part of the district were not available.  
 
Labor Regulation.  State labor regulation indicators are from Besley and Burgess (2004), and indicate 
whether a state has a pro employer, pro worker, or neutral labor market regulation based on amendments 
to the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act.  Smaller states not covered in Besley and Burgess (2004) were 
coded as neutral.  We use information for 1991. 
 
Poverty Measures.  Headcount ratio and poverty gap are from Topalova (2005). They are computed 
from the household expenditure information in "thick" rounds of the Consumption and Expenditure 
Schedule of the NSS. The measures are computed at a district and NSS region level, using poverty lines 
proposed by Deaton (2003a, 2003b) and Deaton's methodology to adjust poverty measures in 1999/2000 
NSS round for the change in the recall period.  
 
Agricultural Wages.  Agricultural wages are the average daily male agricultural wage in a district from 
the Evenson and McKinsey India Agriculture and Climate dataset (available at 
http://chd.ucla.edu/dev_data/index.html). The wage data, spanning 1971-1994 in the original dataset, 
  31was updated until 1998. We thank Rohini Pande and Siddharth Sharma for providing us with the 
updated data. Districts are defined by 1961 district boundaries. This data covers only a subset of districts 
(271 across 13 Indian states). They are deflated by the state-specific Consumer Price Index for 
Agricultural laborers (CPIAL) (reference period October 1973-March 1974) from Ozler, Datt and 
Ravallion (1996).  
 
Consumption Tariff.  Schedule 1 of the NSS contains a detailed consumption module with information 
on home production and purchases of an array of food and non-food goods. We use this data to 
construct district specific consumption weights for goods in the survey. Define  as the 
share of total expenditures in district d in 1987 spent on good p. The product of   with 
the tariff on good p at time t gives us a measure of how important a tariff on product p is for a district d 
resident, assuming homogenous transmission of tariffs across districts within a given product. Summing 
across all products, we derive a measure of the consumer's perception of tariffs in a given district: 
, ,1987 pd consshare
, ,1987 pd consshare
, , ,1987 , * dt pd pt
p
ConsTariff consshare Tariff =∑ . 
Input Tariff.  We rely on the Indian national input-output (IO) table for 1993, 1991 Indian Census, and 
output tariffs in the construction of the industry input tariffs. For each industry i, we create an input 
tariff for that industry as the weighted average of tariffs on inputs used in production for industry i. The 
weights are constructed as industry j's share of industry i's total input cost: . The district input 
tariff is constructed by weighting industry i's input tariff by i's employment share in the district in 1991: 
, ,1993 ji sh
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Educational Loans.  Information on whether a household has a loan for educational expense purposes 
is from the Employment and Unemployment schedule of the 43
rd and 55
th round of the NSS. This 
question is only asked to agricultural workers (excluding everybody that is self employed or employed 
elsewhere) and it covers on average 30% of households in a rural district.  
 
Ratio of per capita expenditure of literate to per capital expenditure of illiterate.  This ratio is 
computed in two ways. One measure is based on the information on household expenditures provided in 
the Employment and Unemployment module (schedule 10 of NSS) that does not suffer from changes in 
recall period in 1999/2000 round. The other measure is obtained from the consumption module 
(Schedule 1).  
 
Educational Expenditure data.  We rely on two sources for educational expenditure data. The first 
source is the expenditure data in Schedule 1 of the 43
rd and 55
th round of the NSS. The question on 
educational expenditure changed in the questionnaire between the 43 and 55th round from 30 day to 12 
month recall period. Expenditures include expenditures on books and journals, newspapers, periodicals, 
library charges, stationery, tuition and other fees (school, college, etc.), private tutor/coaching centre 
(this category is only in the 55
th round), other educational expenses. We compute per capita household 
education expenditure (deflated by deflators proposed by Deaton 2003a, 2003b) and the share of 
educational expenditures in the household total expenditures.  
 
We also obtain information on educational expenditure from the 42
nd (1986-87) and 52
nd (1995-96) 
round of the NSS, Schedule 25.2, that do not suffer from the change in the questionnaire problem. 
However, they rely on fewer observations than the "thick" NSS rounds. The data reports the total 
expenditures on education that include tuition fee, examination fee, other fees & pays, books, 
  32stationeries, uniforms, transport charges, private coaching / tuition, and other expenditures for each child 
in the household. We construct total educational expenditure as a share of total household expenditure, 
and total educational expenditure for each child 10-14. Using data from the 42
nd round, we compute the 
prevalence of free tuition (free education), prevalence of mid-day meals, and prevalence of scholarships 
among children attending primary school at a district level. 
 
School Infrastructure.  We use the village abstracts in the 1991 Indian Census to construct the number 
of primary schools and total number of schools in rural district. Information on the number of primary 
and total number of schools in a district in the post reform period is from 7
th (2002) All Indian 
Education Survey (AIES). We also use the 6
th (1993) and 7
th round of the AIES to obtain the pupil 
teacher ratios in each district. 
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Note: Each point on the middle curve represents the coefficient on tariff for the age group listed with the share of 
literate population in a district as dependent variable. Starting at age 15, the data are available only in 5 year age blocks. 





  38Table 1: Activities of Children in Rural India, 1983-2000
1983 87/88 93/94 99/00
Attend School .485 .550 .667 .727
Work .360 .250 .205 .142
Work Only .355 .246 .202 .137
Market Work .193 .138 .109 .076
Domestic work .167 .113 .096 .066
Note: Each cell contains the participation share in the indicated activity
(row) for the indicated survey round of the NSS (column) for children ages
10-14. Information on participation in types of work is based on the child's
principal usual activity. Domestic work includes chores, collection
activities, and sewing, tailoring, weaving, etc for household use. Market
work includes work in a household enterprise such as a farm or business,
wage work, and begging. Work refers to participation in market work or
domestic work as a principal usual activity. Work only indicates that the
child reports market or domestic work as a principal usual activity and does
not report attending school. All means are weighted to be nationally
representative. Table 2: District Tariff Measures in Rural India
87/88 99/00
Tariff .080 .025
Tariff on Traded Goods (Trtariff) .883 .308
Agricultural Goods Only .812 .230
Mining and Manufacturing Only .901 .337
Note:  Tariff is the employment weighted average nominal ad-valorem tariff at time t in a 
district.  Employment weights are based on pre-liberalization employment shares in a 
district.  Workes in nontraded industries (service, trade, transportation, construction, 
workers in growing of cereals and oilseeds) are assigned zero tariffs in all years in this 
measure.  Average tariff on traded goods is employment-weighted tariff over the set of 
traded industries (i.e. it abstracts from individuals working in nontraded industries in a 
given district.  All means are weighted.  The tariff measure for 87/88 NSS round is based 
on tariff information for 1987.  Tariff measure for NSS 99/00 round is based on tariff 
information for 1997.Table 3: School Attendance and Tariffs in Rural India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Data
pre and post 
reform
pre and post 
reform




pre and post 
reform
Tariff 0.376*** 0.362** 0.618*** -0.087 0.370**
[0.090] [0.137] [0.156] [0.129] [0.148]
Post Reform Indicator (Post) 0.172***
[0.011]
Pre-reform Trend in Schooling*Post 0.178**
[0.078]
IV with traded tariff no yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes n.a. n.a. yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  no yes n.a. n.a. yes
Region Indicators n.a. n.a. yes yes n.a.
Initial Region Conditions*Post  n.a. n.a. yes yes n.a.
R
2 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.26
N 95488 95488 95249 102955 93285
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level.  ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level.   
Demographic controls include a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial in age 
interacted with the gender indicator.  Household controls include indicators for whether a child's household belongs to a scheduled 
caste and schedule tribe, indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of 
the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy.  Initial district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator 
include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed 
in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is 
a scheduled caste/tribe,  the percentage of literate population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.  
Regressions in columns 3 and 4 replace all district-level variables with their equivalents at the region level.  Post reform indicator in 
column 4 refers to 1987 NSS round. Differences in sample size across columns are due to missing data (column 3 and 5) or 
different samples (column 4).Table 4: School Attendance, Tariffs, and Other Reforms  in Rural India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tariff 0.362** 0.319** 0.365*** 0.387*** 0.408*** 0.383*** 0.394***
[0.137] [0.139] [0.135] [0.136] [0.148] [0.125] [0.142]








Number of primary schools per capita 25.031 11.361
[18.173] [18.428]
IV with traded tariff yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R
2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
N 95488 95488 95488 95249 95488 95488 95249
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Demographic
controls include a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial in age interacted with the
gender indicator. Household controls include indicators for whether a child's household belongs to a scheduled caste and schedule tribe,
indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of the child's household gender, age,
education, and literacy. Initial district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a
district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in
services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate
















Ratio in Primary 
Schools (AIES)
Pupil Teacher 
Ratio in Upper 
Primary schools 
(AIES)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariff -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0001 30.71 20.661
[0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0010] [36.966] [24.196]
IV with traded tariff yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.93 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.83 0.84
N 798 798 798 798 787 787
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Information on number of primary
schools per capita and total schools per 1991 capita in columns 1 and 2 is from 1991 Census (for pre-reform period) and 7th AIES for post reform period. Information
in columsn 4-6 is from 6th and 7th AIES for the pre- and post- reform round, respectively. Initial district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator
include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport,
employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate population in a
district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Differences in sample sizes reflect missing observations.Table 6:  Population and Tariffs  by District, Rural Census Results
Log Population Male Female Ratio
0-14 15+ Total 0-14 15+ Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Tariff -0.075 -0.223 -0.164 0.076 -0.136 -0.077
[0.251] [0.144] [0.171] [0.070] [0.124] [0.083]
IV with Traded Tariff yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.99 1 1 0.96 0.9 0.92
N 798 798 798 798 798 798
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Initial
district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture,
employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the
omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate population in a district, and
state-labor laws indicators.  Data: district tabulations of 1991 and 2001 Indian Census.Table 7:  Rural Schooling Attendance and Alternative District Tariffs
Dep. Variable: Attend School (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tariff (Employment Based) 0.362** 0.365*** 0.471*
[0.137] [0.134] [0.269]
Consumption tariff -0.076 -0.122 -0.151
[0.117] [0.115] [0.147]
Input tariff -0.322 -0.413
[1.243] [1.187]
IV for Employment Based Tariff yes n.a. yes n.a. yes
IV for Consumption Tariff n.a. no no n.a. no
IV for Input Tariff n.a. n.a. n.a. yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  yes yes yes yes yes
R
2 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26
N 95488 95488 95488 95488 95488
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
level. Demographic controls include third order polynomial in child's age and gender. Demographic controls
include a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial in age interacted
with the gender indicator. Household controls include indicators for whether a child's household belongs to a
scheduled caste and schedule tribe, indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh,
and controls for the head of the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy. Initial district conditions that
are interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture,
employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services
(construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tariff -0.032 0.042 -0.678 -0.468 -0.351 -0.244
[0.266] [0.199] [0.563] [0.424] [0.343] [0.257]
IV with Traded Tariff yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  yes yes yes yes yes yes
Data Source Schedule 1 Schedule 1 Schedule 10 Schedule 10 Schedule 1 Schedule 1
r2 0.63 0.63 0.58 0.59 0.64 0.65
N 798 798 798 798 797 797
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. Initial district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator include the
percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport,
employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate
population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Differences in sample sizes reflect missing observations.Table 9:  Adult Male Employment in Wage Work by Literacy and Tariffs in Rural India
Participation in Wage 
Work Days in  Wage Work
(1) (2)










IV with traded tariff yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes
Household Controls yes yes
District Indicators yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post  yes yes
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
level. Demographic controls include a third order polynomial in age. Household controls include indicators for
whether a person's household belongs to a scheduled caste and schedule tribe, indicators for whether the person's
household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh. Initial district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator
include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in
manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the omitted
category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate population in a
district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Data restricted to males ages 25-50.Table 10: Activities of children by gender and tariffs  in rural India





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All
tariff 0.362** -0.117 -0.122 0.05 -0.167** -0.240**
[0.137] [0.110] [0.111] [0.093] [0.076] [0.097]
r2 0.26 0.2 0.2 0.14 0.15 0.14
N 95488 95514 95488 95514 95514 95488
Panel B: Boys
tariff 0.261* -0.122 -0.087 -0.07 -0.052** -0.174
[0.147] [0.116] [0.118] [0.121] [0.022] [0.112]
r2 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.12
N 51153 51170 51153 51170 51170 51153
Panel C: Girls
tariff 0.501** -0.127 -0.172 0.203** -0.329* -0.328**
[0.206] [0.150] [0.148] [0.099] [0.165] [0.129]
r2 0.32 0.23 0.23 0.18 0.13 0.17
N 44335 44344 44335 44344 44344 44335
IV with traded tariffs yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level.
Demographic controls include a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial
in age interacted with the gender indicator. Household controls include indicators for whether a child's household belongs
to a scheduled caste and schedule tribe, indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and
controls for the head of the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy. Initial district conditions that are
interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in
mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the
omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate population in a
district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Diferences in sample sizes reflect missing observations.Table 11: Poverty, Agricultural Wages and Tariffs in Rural India




Tariff -0.494** -0.195*** 1.051**
[0.239] [0.069] [0.407]
IV with Traded Tariff yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes
Year Indicators yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Year Indicators yes yes yes
Data NSS (43rd, 55th rnd) NSS (43rd, 55th rnd) 1987-1998
R2 0.83 0.79 0.73
N 724 724 2,750
Notes: Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level in columns 1 and 2 and district level in column 3. ***,
**, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Initial conditions that are interacted with year indicators include the
percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in
trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population
that is a scheduled caste/tribe,  the percentage of literate population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.    
Data: Columns 1 and 2 use 43rd and 55th round of NSS.  Estimates in columns 1 & 2 include only districts in states in which 
poverty lines are available. Results are similar if we include all states, with poverty lines assumed to be equal to neighboring 
states’ poverty lines when missing. Column 3 uses data on agricultural wages from Evanson and McKinsey dataset that was 
updated to 1998.  Agricultural wage data is available annually, but only for a subset of districts. We follow a specification 
that parallels equation (7) and regress log wages in a district on district tariff, year indicators, the interactions of pre-reform 
district characteristics with the year indicators, and instrument for tariff with traded tariff. Standard errors are clustered at the 











expenditure as a 










expenditure as a 
share of  total hh 
expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Cross-sectional unit  household household household household individual individual individual
Tariff -0.030*** 16.581*** 1.919*** 0.054*** 28.113*** 1.901*** 0.045
[0.010] [4.580] [0.467] [0.016] [7.763] [0.498] [0.029]
IV with Traded Tariff yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic characteristics n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  yes yes yes
Household characteristics yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicators (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Data 43rd, 55th rnd 43rd, 55th rnd 43rd, 55th rnd 43rd, 55th rnd 42nd, 52nd rnd 42nd, 52nd rnd 42nd, 52nd rnd
R2 0.01 0.13 0.32 0.14 0.28 0.33 0.02
N 49435 63732 63732 63732 68647 68647 68545
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Demographic controls include a third order polynomial in the child's
age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial in age interacted with the gender indicator. Household controls include an indicator for whether a household belongs to a scheduled caste or
schedule tribe, household religion and controls for the head of the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy. 42nd and 52nd round do not provide information on a household's
religion. Initial district conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in
manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the
percentage of literate population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Differences is sample sizes reflect different data sources and/or missing data.
Data in columns 1-4:  43rd and 55th round of NSS.  Please see data appendix for details. Education loans data is only available for households of agricultural laborers. The changes in the recall 
period in the consumption modules can effect the data used in columns 1-4.  Data in columns 5-7: 42nd and 52nd round of NSS.  1987 tariff matched to 42nd round, 1994 tariff matched to 52nd 
round.  The 42nd (1986) and 52nd (1995) round of NSS also provide information on total education expenditure per child and do not suffer from changes in the questionnaire (they have smaller 























IV with Traded Tariff yes yes
Demographic characteristics yes yes
Household characteristics yes yes
District Indicators yes yes
Post Reform Indicators (Post) yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post yes yes
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level.  ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent 
level.  Household roster in 42nd round only provides information on  enrollment, so we assume that school 
enrollment equal attendance in 42nd round in column 1.  Demographic controls include a third order polynomial in 
the child's age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial in age interacted with the gender indicator.    
Household controls include an indicator for whether a child's household belongs to a scheduled caste or schedule 
tribe and controls for the head of the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy.  Initial district 
conditions that are interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a district employed 
in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, 
employed in services, the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe,  the percentage of literate 
population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.  Data: 42nd and 52nd round of NSS.  1987 tariff matched 
to 42nd round, 1994 tariff matched to 52nd round.  Table 14: Activities of Children, Poverty, and Tariffs in rural India









(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
poverty measure: headcount ratio poverty measure: poverty gap
Panel A: All
poverty measure -0.794** 0.303 0.321 -0.036 0.338 0.473** -2.354** 0.897 0.952 -0.106 1.003 1.402**
[0.366] [0.246] [0.246] [0.193] [0.223] [0.220] [1.001] [0.688] [0.682] [0.575] [0.624] [0.648]
r2 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.24 0.2 0.2 0.14 0.15 0.13
N 86938 86959 86938 86959 86959 86938 86938 86959 86938 86959 86959 86938
Panel B: Boys
poverty measure -0.545 0.291 0.254 0.184 0.107** 0.291 -1.623* 0.865 0.757 0.548 0.318** 0.867
[0.329] [0.242] [0.244] [0.245] [0.044] [0.237] [0.896] [0.679] [0.686] [0.703] [0.129] [0.692]
r2 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.12
N 46589 46604 46589 46604 46604 46589 46589 46604 46589 46604 46604 46589
Panel C: Girls
poverty measure -1.167* 0.351 0.427 -0.347 0.698 0.740** -3.426* 1.028 1.253 -1.018 2.046 2.173**
[0.609] [0.366] [0.376] [0.284] [0.521] [0.342] [1.730] [1.043] [1.064] [0.791] [1.437] [1.011]
r2 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.29 0.23 0.23 0.17 0.11 0.15
N 40349 40355 40349 40355 40355 40349 40349 40355 40349 40355 40355 40349
IV yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Demographic Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Household Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District Indicators yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Post Reform Indicator (Post) yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Initial District Conditions*Post yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Standard errors in brackets are clustered at state-year level. ***, **, * denotes significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Demographic controls include a third order polynomial in the child's age, a gender
indicator, and a third order polynomial in age interacted with the gender indicator. Household controls include an indicator for whether a child's household belongs to a scheduled caste or schedule tribe,
indicators for whether the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy. Initial district conditions that are interacted
with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in
services (construction is the omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe, the percentage of literate population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators. Differences in







Scheduled Caste .183 .215





Head Female .085 .086
Head Age 45.077 44.576
Head Literate .463 .506
Head Complete Primary .139 .123
Head Complete Middle .083 .118
Head Complete Secondary .058 .062
Head Complete Higher than Secondary .013 .051
Household Education Expenditure information (43rd and 55th round) 1987/88 1999/00 NSS
Household has loan for educational expense purposes  .003 .002
Household Educational Expenditures per capita 2.752 4.597
Log (1+hh educational expenditures per capita) .647 1.184
Household Educational Expenditure as a share of total household budget .015 .022
Education Expenditure information for an individual (42nd and 52nd round) 1986/87 1995/96 NSS
Educational Expenditures  8.660 14.267
Log (1+educational expenditures)   1.268 1.791
Educational Expenditure per child as a share of total household budget .015 .015
Baseline Prevalence of mid-day meals in a district (1986/87)  .192
Baseline Prevalence of free tuition in a district (1986/87) .903
Baseline Prevalence of scholarships in a district (1986/87) .021
The reported numbers are means. Appendix Table A.1 continued: Descriptive Statistics 
Period Source
District-level variables 1987/88 1999/00 See data appendix
Consumption Tariff .567 .177
Input Tariff .626 .199
Exports 25.7 97.5
Licensed Industries .003 .001
FDI .000 .002
Number of primary schools per person .001 .001
Number of banks per 1000 people .064 .078
Basline District Characteristics 1991 Census
Emp. Share Services .072
Emp. Share Transport .013
Emp. Share Trade .033
Emp. Share Mining .005
Emp. Share Agriculture .806
Emp. Share Manufacturing .056
Share Literate .373
Share Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe  .321
Other district-level variables 1987/88 1999/00 NSS
Headcount Ratio .373 .242
Poverty Gap .089 .048
PCE Literate/PCE Illiterate (Schedule 10) 1.324 1.248
PCE Literate/PCE Illiterate (Schedule 1) 1.309 1.247
PCE Primary/PCE Non-primary (Schedule 1) 1.401 1.317
1987 1998
District Agricultural Wages (log real wages) 1.715 1.919 Pande, Sharma
The reported numbers are simple district means.  PCE stands for percapita household expenditure.Appendix Table A.2:  First Stage Results for Table 3, column 2
Dep. Variable: District Tariff
 





Post Reform Indicator yes
Initial District Characteristics*Post Reform yes




Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at state-year level.  ***, **, * denotes 
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level.   a third order polynomial in the child's 
age, a gender indicator, and a third order polynomial in age interacted with the 
gender indicator.  Household controls include an indicator for whether a child's 
household belongs to a scheduled caste or schedule tribe, indicators for whether 
the child's household is hindu, muslim, christian, sikh, and controls for the head of 
the child's household gender, age, education, and literacy.  Initial conditions that 
are interacted with post reform indicator include the percentage of workers in a 
district employed in agriculture, employed in mining, employed in manufacturing, 
employed in trade, employed in transport, employed in services (construction is the 
omitted category), the share of district’s population that is a scheduled caste/tribe,  
the percentage of literate population in a district, and state-labor laws indicators.  
Data:  43rd and 55th rounds of the NSS.